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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Serv. Dep't' posed the
problem of determining when an employee's injuries "arise out of
and are in the course of" employment so as to entitle him to re-
covery under the New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act2 (here-
inafter referred to as the Act).
Betty Jean Edens was one of four Albuquerque employees of
HSSD whom defendant HSSD required to attend a two-day confer-
ence in Santa Fe. To reduce its reimbursement costs, HSSD re-
quested the employees to form a car pool. For the same reason,
HSSD requested that they return to Albuquerque after each day's
session rather than stay overnight in Santa Fe.
Mrs. Edens and three other HSSD employees agreed to meet at an
Albuquerque parking lot from which they would proceed to Santa
Fe in Mrs. Edens' car. After the first session, Mrs. Edens drove the
other three employees to the Albuquerque parking lot from which
the four proceeded home separately. En route home from the park-
ing lot, Mrs. Edens was fatally injured in a collision with another
vehicle.
Boyce D. Edens, widower of the deceased, brought suit in district
court to recover workmen's compensation benefits pursuant to the
Act. The plaintiff claimed that the death of Betty Jean Edens was an
injury arising out of and in the course of her employment.3 In par-
ticular, he sought to avoid the application of what is termed the
"going and coming" rule: that an injury does not arise out of and in
the course of employment if it is sustained while the employee is
going to or coming from work.4 The plaintiff relied on a widely
recognized exception to this rule, referred to as the "special errand
rule."' Under it, if an employer requests an employee to journey off
1. 88 N.M. 366, 540 P.2d 846 (1975).
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 59-10-1 to 37 (Repl. 1974, Supp. 1975).
3. Memorandum Trial Brief, p. 2, Edens v. H.S.S.D., Dist. Ct.
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-12.12 (Repl. 1974, Supp. 1975):
"injury . . . arising out of and in the course of employment" . . . shall not
include injuries to any workman occurring while on his way to assume the
duties of his employment or after leaving.
5. 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 16.10 (1972).
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the employer's premises, the journey itself may become part of the
service performed, thus within the course of employment.
After trial, the district court found that Mrs. Edens was not acting
in the scope and course of her employment at the time of the acci-
dent.6 Fact findings by the court suggest that this holding was
grounded on the theory that she was within the going and coming
rule once she left the Albuquerque parking lot. Hence her injury was
not compensable.
The trial court found that Mrs. Edens was free to drive to her
home or elsewhere once her fellow employees had left her car,7 and
that she had completed all of the duties of her employment for the
day before the time of the accident.'
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed. It viewed the evi-
dence and the district court's findings of fact as showing that the
accident occurred after decedent's work had ended. The court held
that the day's employment began at the parking lot at the beginning
of the day and terminated there on return from Santa Fe. The court
considered the material factor to be the service to be performed for
the employer. In so holding, the court rejected the plaintiff's conten-
tion that because Mrs. Edens was required to be on the highway after
work incidental to her employment all driving to and from Santa Fe
was done in the course of employment.
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed.9 As a preliminary mat-
ter, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the trial
court determination that Mrs. Eden's injury did not arise out of her
employment was a finding of fact or of law. The Court noted that
the district court had regarded them as conclusions of fact and that
thereafter the parties and the Court of Appeals had assumed that this
was the case. This is important, since the rule that fact findings will
not be overturned if supported by substantial evidence is applicable
to workmen's compensation cases.' 0 The rule that findings of law
are freely reviewable likewise applies.' ' The Court stated that the
determination of whether a finding was of fact or of law was itself a
question of law and thus freely reviewable. It concluded that since
the historical facts were undisputed, the question of whether the
6. Edens v. New Mexico Health and Social Serv. Dep't, 88 N.M. 366, 540 P.2d 846
(1975).
7. Dist. Ct. finding of fact #10.
8. Dist. Ct. finding of fact #13.
9. Edens v. New Mexico Health and Social Serv. Dep't, N.M. , 547 P.2d 65
(1976).
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-13.9 (Repl. 1974), states that the Rules of Civil Procedure
apply to workmen's compensation cases except where the Act provides otherwise.
11. Id.
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accident arose out of and in the course of employment was a ques-
tion of law.
The Court found that HSSD had sent Mrs. Edens on a "special
mission" as that term is used in Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co.' 2 The
Court then considered whether the mission had been completed at
the time of the accident. The Court again relied on Wilson, which in
turn had quoted Rafferty v. Dairymen's League Co-op Ass'n. ' In-
fluenced by the "portal to portal" language of Rafferty,1 4 the Court
concluded that the logical starting point for the mission was ". . . the
moment she left her home for Santa Fe. . . ."' ' Similarly, the Court
found that each employee was within the scope of his employment
until the moment he returned home at the end of the
day.... 6
The Court rejected the defendant's contention that the starting
and ending points of the mission were at the Albuquerque parking
lot, holding that the agreement among the employees to meet there
did not determine the scope of employment. Rather, the scope of
employment is determined by the employer's directions. The Court
thus held that the special errand rule' ' applied to the case and
consequently that Mrs. Edens' injuries arose out of and in the course
of her employment. Thus, Edens approves a broad special errand
exception to the coming and going rule." 8 The significance of this is
12. 55 N.M. 81, 94, 227 P.2d 365, 373 (1950):
... When an employee is sent by his employer on a special mission away
from his regular work, .. . while on such mission, .. . the employee is acting
within the course of his employment. ... If an employee is accidentally in-
jured while on such a mission .... the injury arises out of and in the course of
his employment....
13. 16 N.J. Misc. 363, 200 A. 493 (1938):
... But if, while so off duty from his regular employment, he is called to do
an errand or sent on a mission by the employer, the courts which have spoken
on this subject hold it as a special service begun the moment the employee
leaves his home, or the place where the call comes to him, and ended only
with his return....
14. Id.
15. N.M. ,547 P.2d at 68.
16. Id.
17. Larson, supra, note 5, 16.10 describes the rule:
The special errand rule may be stated as follows: When an employee, having
identifiably time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises
journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and
coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by
the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special
inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances,
is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service
itself.
18. Edens v. New Mexico Health and Social Serv. Dep't, N.M. ,547 P.2d 65, at
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that the rule adopted confers "portal to portal" coverage on the
employee' 9 so that a worker determined to have undertaken a
special errand is within the scope of his employment from the time
he leaves his home until his return.2 0
Previous New Mexico decisions did not confer such broad coverage
under the Act,2 1 although the New Mexico courts had recognized
exceptions to the going and coming rule.2 2 The cases recognizing the
exceptions sometimes used the terms "special mission" and "special
errand" interchangeably, 2 3 as indeed was the case in Edens.2 4 The
distinction between the two terms is that the latter is an exception to
"... In considering the special errand rule, which is an exception to the 'going
and coming rule,'..."
19. See Larson, supra, note 5, 16.10.
20. Note that the special errand rule as stated in Note 17, supra, applies to those cases
where at least one terminus of the journey is the employee's home. This is because the going
and coming rule pertains to such journeys, and the special errand rule is an exception to that
rule.
21. The Supreme Court considered the special errand rule in Ross v. Marberry & Co., 66
N.M. 404, 349 P.2d 123 (1960). The Court stated that the rule was an exception to the
going and coming rule, but declined to apply the exception in Ross. The Court concluded
that ". . . the mere fact that appellant, at the request of his employer, departed twenty-five
minutes early for work and his usual destination, following his usual route, in order to
accomplish a task which was one of his regular duties..." was insufficient to place, the
employee without the operation of the going and coming rule.
22. McKinney v. Dorlac, 48 N.M. 149, 146 P.2d 867 (1944); Barrington v. John Drilling
Co., 59 N.M. 172, 181 P.2d 166 (1947); Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 227
P.2d 365 (1950); Brown v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 70 N.M. 99, 370 P.2d 816 (1962).
Barrington, Rowan, and Brown involved "going and coming" between home and work.
Although the cases might have been analyzed as special errand cases, there were other
factors present in each which may have brougt the journeys within the scope of employ-
ment independently of the special errand rule: additional compensation for providing
transportation for other workers (Barrington); additional duty to see that a full crew was on
the work site at the proper time (Rowan); employee charged with carrying a report home
(Brown). McKinney seems a classic case where the special errand rule would apply:
McKinney and his employer agreed that the former would travel from Albuquerque, the
usual place of employment, to Roswell, for the purpose of preparing for a plastering job
soon to start there. Mr. McKinney was to act as foreman on the job and was to leave on the
day following the making of the agreement. He was paid in advance for the day of travel, for
which he used his own car. McKinney was fatally injured en route to Roswell. The New
Mexico Supreme Court did not discuss the facts in terms of the special errand rule, simply
concluding that ". . . the main purpose in making the trip from Albuquerque, New Mexico,
to Roswell, New Mexico, was in the furtherance of the business of the appellant Dorlac."
Thus, the Court found that the employee was within the scope of his employment at the
time of his injury.
23. See e.g., Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 94, 227 P.2d 365, 373 (1950):
"... when an employee is sent by his employer on a special mission away
from his regular work .. " But in Rowan, the employee was going to work at
the time of his injury. Therefore, his trip was, in Larson's terms, a special
errand.
24. Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Serv. Dep't, N.M. ,547 P.2d 65, at 68:
"... Edens was sent on a special mission to the meeting in Santa Fe..." and
"we agree that the special errand rule is applicable to this case. .. "
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the going and coming rule, and comes into operation only in those
cases where the employee is going from work to his home or vice-
versa.2 ' The term "special mission" is used to describe those
situations in which the employer sends the employee off the
premises on a mission. In these cases the going and coming rule
would not apply since, of course, the employee is not on his way
home from work while on the errand. 26 The question remains then
as to whether, under New Mexico law, there is any distinction be-
tween the terms "special mission" and "special errand."
The Court in Edens made it clear that the directions of the em-
ployer determine the scope of the employment. Suppose the em-
ployees had been directed to form their car pool at the usual place of
employment. Under Edens this would mean that the employment
started when the employees left the employer's premises and not
when they left their homes. Moreover, this is in accord with the
definition of the special errand rule set out in the treatises.2 7 The
employees would be on a special mission from the time they left the
place of employment until their return, but they would not be on a
special errand from the moment they left their homes until their
return there.2 8 By contrast, the Edens court saw the distinction as a
question of whether the employee was or was not performing the
''special mission" at the time of the accident.
The better approach is to consider the journey as a whole to
determine whether the circumstances warrant treating the trip itself
as part of the service to be performed by the employer. The em-
ployer's instructions will then define the duration of the trip. If no
employer instructions define the trip, the special errand rule confers
portal-to-portal coverage. The alternative of attempting to choose a
particular point in the journey at which to mark the beginning of the
"mission," leads to the same difficulty rejected in Edens.
Schiller v. Southwest Air Rangers, Inc.2 9 overruled three previous
cases which had held that attorney fees cannot be awarded in work-
men's compensation cases in which only medical and hospital
25. Larson, supra, note 5, 16.10.
26. "Dual purpose" trips where, say, the employer asks the employee to run an errand
on the way home from work are, of course, not taken into account here.
27. This assumes that the starting and ending times of the mission approximate those of
a normal work day. If there is sufficient deviation from these norms, the special errand rule
could come into operation (". .. the journey may be brought within the course of employ-
ment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, . . . is itself sufficiently
substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself." Larson, supra, note 17). Cf.
Ross v. Marberry & Co., 66 N.M. 404, 349 P.2d 123 (1960).
28. Supra note 17.
29. 87 N.M. 476, 535 P.2d 1327 (1975).
May 1976]
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expenses are recovered.3 0 The district court and the New Mexico
Court of Appeals3 had relied on Wuenschel v. New Mexico Broad-
casting Corp.3 2 and Lasater v. Home Oil Co.," 3 both of which the
Supreme Court acknowledged as supporting the Court of Appeals
holding. The Court held that Wuenschel and Lasater were
erroneously based on Rayburn v. Boys Super Market, Inc.34 and
Nasci v. Frank Paxton Lumber Co.3 S
The Court noted that whether the term "compensation" includes
medical expenses under the Act 3 6 was left open in the Nasci deci-
sion. However, the Court focused on language in Nasci tying the
word "compensation" to medical payments. 3 ' The Court quoted
Rayburn for a like connection between medical payments and com-
pensation. Rayburn had applied N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-23(D)
(Repl. 1974)38 to a situation in which the employer's liability was
less than the settlement offer and thus concluded that attorney fees
were not allowable. 3 9 The Court in Schiller observed that medical
and surgical expenses were considered in determining whether the
claimant in Rayburn collected compensation exceeding the settle-
ment offer.4 0 Based on the "implicit recognition" in Nasci and Ray-
burn that medical expenses are "compensation," together with the
principle that the provisions of the Act are to be liberally construed
in favor of the employee, the Court held that medical expenses are
compensation for the purpose of allowing attorney fees under Sec-
tion 59-10-23(D).
Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Chapman4 1 considered the prob-
30. Cromer v. J. W. Jones Constr. Co., 79 N.M. 179, 441 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1968);
Wuenschel v. New Mexico Broadcasting Corp., 84 N.M. 109, 500 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1972);
Lasater v. Home Oil Co., 83 N.M. 567, 494 P.2d 980 (Ct. App. 1972).
31. 88 N.M. 27, 536 P.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1975).
32. 84 N.M. 109, 500 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1972).
33. 83 N.M. 567, 494 P.2d 980 (Ct. App. 1972).
34. 74 N.M. 712, 397 P.2d 953 (1964).
35. 69 N.M. 412, 367 P.2d 913 (1961).
36. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-23 (Repl. 1974) governs the awarding of attorney fees
under the Act. Subsection D thereof, at issue in Schiller, states that where the employee has
refused the employer's settlement offer of "compensation," and where subsequently he is
awarded "compensation" in a greater amount in court proceedings, then reasonable attor-
ney fees will be allowed.
37. ".... the compensation to which he is entitled may be nothing more than medical
and surgical payments ... ,. Nasci v. Frank Paxton Lumber Co. 69 N.M. 412, 415, 369 P.2d
913, 915 (1961).
38. Supra note 16.
39. Id.
40. The Schiller court quoted the following passage in support of this conclusion:
.. . the total amount of the employer's liability, including the medical and hospital ex-
penses, was less than the $3200 offered in settlement. .
41. 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222 (1975).
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lem of when an employee may elect to sue a physician who ag-
gravated the original work-related injury, rather than hold the em-
ployer liable under the Act for such injuries. Chapman sustained an
injury during the course of his employment and was admitted to
Presbyterian Hospital for medical treatment. Chapman, who was self
employed, was both the employer and the employee. He notified his
insurer, Security, of the accident, and Security discharged its obliga-
tion to pay Chapman's medical expenses and compensation pursuant
to the Act.
Thereafter, Chapman and Security brought an action for negli-
gence against Presbyterian Hospital, et al., alleging that the wrong
type of blood was administered to Chapman when he was treated for
his injury. Chapman sought damages for injuries and losses resulting
from the mismatch of blood, and the insurance company sought
reimbursement for medical expenses and compensation benefits
allegedly paid as a result of the medical negligence which aggravated
Chapman's injury.
Without notifying Security, Chapman settled his suit with the hos-
pital, which agreed to indemnify Chapman against any subrogation
claim which the insurer might bring against him. After the settlement
Security amended its complaint to include a count against Chapman
for reimbursement of that part of the settlement which the insurer
attributed to damages paid by it to Chapman as a result of the
mismatch of blood. The amended complaint also requested a declara-
tory judgment to determine the rights and obligations of the various
parties. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The plain-
tiff insurer appealed.
At issue is the meaning of Sections 59-10-19.1(B)4" and
42.
In case the employer has made provisions for, and has at the service of the
workman at the time of the accident, adequate surgical, hospital and medical
facilities and attention and offers to furnish these services during the period
necessary, then the employer shall be under no obligation to furnish additional
surgical, medical or hospital services or, medicine than those so provided;
Provided, however, that the employer furnishing such surgical, medical and
hospital services and medicines shall be liable to the workman for injuries
resulting from neglect, lack of skill, or care on the part of any person, partner-
ship, corporation or association employed by the employer to care for the
workman. In the event, however, that any employer becomes liable to the
workman, it shall be optional with the workman injured in such a manner to
accept the foregoing provisions and hold the employer liable for the injuries,
or to reject these provisions and retain the right to sue the person, partnership,
corporation or association employed by the employer who injures the work-
man through neglect, lack of skill or care. Election to accept or reject the
provisions of this section shall be made by a notice in writing, signed and
May 1976]
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59-10-25(C)4 3 of the Act. Section 19.1(B) provides that when the
employer furnishes hospital and medical facilities to the employee
for treatment of a work-related injury, the employer is liable to the
employee for injuries resulting from negligence on the part of the
hospital or medical facility.4 4 Any cause of action against the third
party is assigned by the employee to the employer. Secondly, the
employee may elect not to hold the employer liable for the sub-
sequent injury and sue the third party directly.4" The employee
must make his election by written notice to the employer.4 6
The insurer, relying on the first clause of Section 59-10-19.1(B), 4 7
urged that the section applied only where the employer actually
maintains hospital and medical facilities for its employees. The
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice MacManus, rejected this
view as too narrow a reading, holding that the section applied to the
case at bar. The Court reasoned that the employee's admittance to
the hospital, his notice of the accident to the insurer, and the fact
that the employer was also the employee were sufficient to justify
the conclusion that the employer made provision for hospital and
medical facilities within the meaning of the section.
The insurer relied on Section 59-10-25(C) as a statutory basis for
its asserted right of reimbursement from Chapman. 4 8 It claimed that
a double recovery would result should Chapman be allowed to retain
dated, given by the workman to his employer; and, if the workman elects to
hold the employer liable for the injuries, the cause of action of the workman
against the third party partnership, corporation or association shall be assigned
to the employer, who may institute proceedings thereon in any court having
jurisdiction, in the workman's name.
43.
The right of any workman, or, in case of his death, of those entitled to receive
payment or damages for injuries occasioned to him by the negligence or wrong
of any person other than the employer or any other employee of the
employer, including a management or supervisory employee, shall not be
affected by the Workmen's Compensation Act, but he or they, as the case may
be, shall not be allowed to receive payment or recover damages therefor and
also claim compensation for the employer, and in such case the receipt of
compensation from the employer shall operate as an assignment to the em-
ployer, his or its insurer, guarantor or surety, as the case may be of any cause
of action, to the extent of payment by the employer to the workman for
compensation, surgical, medical, osteopathic, chiropractic, and hospital
services and medicine occasioned by the injury which the workman or his legal
representative or others may have against any other party for the injuries or
death.
44. Supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Supra note 43.
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both the compensation benefits and the entire sum of the settle-
ment.4"
The Court agreed that an employee may not claim compensation
for an injury for which he already has recovered judgment 0 from a
third party tortfeasor or where he has settled his claim against the
third party.' 1 But Chapman argued that the injury resulting from
the mismatch of blood was separate and distinct from the injury for
which he was compensated and that this second injury was governed
by Section 59-10-19.1(B), and not by Section 59-10-25(C). The
Court's reasoning suggests that where the employee's work-related
injury is aggravated by negligence perpetrated in the course of
medical treatment the employee retains his common law cause of
action against the negligent party until he gives written notice or
accepts compensation clearly designated as compensation for the
subsequent injury which shows that he wishes to'hold the employer
liable for the negligence rather than the tortfeasor. s 2 It is only then
that the employer or his insurer can participate in the recovery
against the third party tortfeasor. The Court thus construed the pro-
vision as making no change in the common law, except that the
employee, upon giving notice, may elect to shift the tort liability
from the third party to the employer.
Since Chapman was both employer and employee, this notice
requirement seems at first glance to lack meaning. Typically, how-
ever, both where the employer is also the employee and where he is
not, it is the insurer who is the real beneficiary of notice. Thus, it
would seem the better procedure to require that the employer-
employee give the written notice to his insurer. The Court, however,
suggested that the employer must assume that no election to hold
him liable has been made, unless he has been so notified in writing,
but that the employee may elect to sue the third party directly
without giving written notice.5 ' This one-sided interpretation seems
49. Id. "... [H]e ... shall not be allowed to receive payment or recover damages there-
for and also claim compensation from the employer ... "
50. White v. New Mexico Highway Comm'n, 42 N.M. 625, 83 P.2d 457 (1938).
51. Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petrol. Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358 (1960).
52. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-19.1(B) (Repl. 1974):
"Election to accept or reject the provisions of this section shall be made by a
notice in writing, signed and dated, given by the workman to his em-
ployer ......
53. 88 N.M. 292, ,540 P.2d 222, 228 (1975):
"The New Mexico statute requires a written election by the employee before
the employer is liable.... Only if the workman makes the election is the cause
of action then assigned to the employer. .. "
... The employee did not give the election in writing as required by the
statute and did not file against the employer.... He instead elected to sue the
physician, technicians and hospital .... [Emphasis supplied.]
May 1976) 421
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unjustified either by the statutory language,' 4 or the circumstances
of self-employment.
The insurer also asserted an equitable right of subrogation, not
decided by the Court, as it was not raised below. The Court sug-
gested, however, that subrogation would not be allowed in such a
case. Discussing the assignment of the cause of action to the em-
ployer, the Court remarked that such an assignment is different from
subrogation to the extent of any amounts the employer may have
paid. Instead, the "entire cause of action" is assigned to the em-
ployer.' s
FRANK M. WILLIAMS
54. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-19.1(B) (Repl. 1974):
"Election to accept or reject the provisions of this section shall be made by a
notice in writing .... " [Emphasis supplied.]
55. 88 N.M. 292, , 540 P.2d 222, 227 (1975).
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